December 16 is a red
letter day for two countries Bangladesh, which won its hard fought freedom from
Pakistan on that day and India which won a decisive war in 1971 with the
humiliating surrender of 93,000 Pakistani soldiers and officers. We celebrate
this day every year but this year it is special as it marks the golden jubilee
of that epic victory. Fifty years ago, on 16 December 1971, Lieutenant-General Amir Abdullah
Khan Niazi, the Commander of the Pakistan Eastern Command, was made to sign the
Instrument of Surrender at Ramna Race Course in Dacca, and the surrender was
accepted by Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, the General Officer
Commanding-in-Chief of India’s Eastern Command. Pakistan lost more than
half of its population and about 15 percent of its territory. However, 61
percent of the 54,500 square miles (1,41,154 sq km) of land lost in the East
was arable, in contrast to a meager 21 percent of the 310,000 square miles
(8,02,896 sq km) it retained.
So what went wrong?
Why was Pakistan Army, a far superior fighting force than the rag tag Mukti
Bahini, defeated within a fortnight? With the United States led by Richard
Nixon and Henry Kissinger by its side and promise of help from all weather
friend China why did they surrender on the 13th day of the war? The
problem was with the two nation theory and the idea of Pakistan. The idea that
religion alone can hold two widely separated land masses, separated by distance,
by language, by culture and by civilization together was preposterous to start
with. The entire West Asia and North Africa minus Israel is Muslim and if Islam
could hold them together they should have been one homogeneous nation, but they
are not! The truth is that they have repeatedly fought wars among themselves
and don’t see eye to eye on many issues.
The
language war
It all started way back in 1952 when Bengalis began mobilising to force the
State to recognise Bengali as a national language. On 21-22 February that year,
the Pakistani armed forces murdered several students as well as numerous others
in indiscriminate firing. Bengalis are proud of their language, of
Rabindranath Thakur and of Kazi Nazrul Islam. Pakistan
wanted to force Urdu as their state language. The Bengali speaking population
resented. Even in West Pakistan only 7.57% people of Pakistan speak Urdu as the
first language. The rest speak Pashto, Punjabi and Sindhi. Even if you go by
religious language Arabic should have been a state language. But they chose
Urdu. Urdu is a mixture of various languages 75% of Urdu has Sanskrit and
Prakrit roots. Persian, Turkic, Arabic contribute another 25% of the language.
Probably Jinnah wanted to choose a language with an Islamic touch at the same time
indigenous to India. But it was certainly alien to the Bengalis.
Cyclone
Bhola
Though East Pakistan
was earning a substantial part of revenue for Pakistan it always received step
brotherly treatment from the central establishment in the West which was
dominated by the feudal Punjabi clan. Not only the Bengalis but even the
Sindhis, the Baluchis and the Pashtus had the same grievance. Before the December
1970 general elections in Pakistan, East Pakistan was ravaged by one of the
deadliest cyclones – Cyclone Bhola. Many lives were lost and homes and
livelihood disrupted, bringing despair and anguish in the lives of 3 to
5,00,000 Bengalis. The establishment in West Pakistan was slow to respond and
India was the first country to offer support. The Awami League, the political
face of the Bengalis was livid because of this obvious neglect. The election
campaign that followed had anti-federation speeches and slogans and eventually
there was a land-slide victory for the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. Even
though things were slipping out of the hands of West Pakistan much before this
Cyclone Bhola was the last nail in the coffin of East Pakistan. Things were so
bad that even if Pakistan had delayed election for 6 month or a year, Awami
League’s victory and subsequent fission of Pakistan was certain.
Murder of
democracy
Sheikh Mujib got the majority in the Pakistan
parliament and not just in East Pakistan alone. Legally and logically he should
have been asked to take oath as the Prime Minister. The Pakistan military
establishment, which was far friendlier with the Punjabi ruling class than the
Bengalis did not go by the logic of democracy. General Yahya Khan refused to
convene Parliament and accept Sheikh Mujib as the Prime Minister even though the East
Pakistan-based Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, had decisively defeated
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples’ Party.
Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman’s party, under the banner of the Six Point Agenda, had long advocated
for greater federalism; separate convertible currencies; fiscal responsibility
to be delegated to the federating units; as well as the right to maintain a
separate militia. Each of these demands came in response to the west’s
cultural, economic, and linguistic oppression; exclusion from the military and
bureaucracy; as well as consistent and calibrated efforts to deprive Bengalis
of their legitimate share of political power. The political elites in the West,
spearheaded by General Yahya and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, wanted a strong federal
government and found the Awami League’s Six-Point Agenda to be a thinly veiled
demand for outright cessation.
There were fears in the military establishment
that since Sheikh Mujeeb won election on the agenda of Independence of Bangladesh it
will not be wise move to handover power to him. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto meanwhile
had massive support in Rawalpindi and he was trying to do everything in order
to become next PM of Pakistan. Despite winning too few seats to veto any
constitution offered by the Awami League, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto refused to let
his party participate in any convening of Parliament and made absurd demands
for a power-sharing agreement. After Mujibur Rahman refused to cede and
insisted upon the Awami League’s right to form the government, General Yahya
Khan commenced Operation Searchlight, which was a brutal and thuggish military
operation to disarm the Bengalis.
Operation Searchlight
To say that Pakistan’s
army was caught between tug of war between Sheikh Mujibur Rehaman and Zulfiquar
Ail Bhutto and hence, Bangladesh fiasco happened is patently wrong, as most of
the oppression and killing was done by the army and not civilians. As usual, whatever
narrative Pakistan builds, in the end Pakistani army is defended or projected
blemish free. All the faults are assigned to politicians or conspiracies. This
time however they were the villains. Their intelligence agency told them that
Awami League was in touch with India and a war may break out in the Eastern
frontier. 5 lakh (5,00,000) Bihari razakhars were given military uniform to give
impression to India that there were more than 8 lakh active Pakistani soldiers.
This was a huge blunder. They were given free hand by Pakistani military
establishment. These razakhars committed untold atrocities – killings,
lootings, rape and genocide of the local Bengalis which further deteriorated
the situation. Pakistan also worked through a number of Islamist militant organizations, including the notoriously violent student wing of
Jamaat-e-Islami to carry out atrocities against the Bengali Hindu minorities
selectively. Pakistani army had expertly exploited religion and political
divisions within the country to entrench themselves in supreme positions of
power and some of them under Genl. Tikka Khan had gone rogue and actively aided
and supported and even participated in these atrocities. What is most shameful
is that though a commission of inquiry, Hamood ur Rehman Commission was set up,
its report was never published in Pakistan and people never came to know what
had actually happened!
The politics of war
Sheikh Mujeeb
was arrested and soon Independence of Bangladesh was announced in Dhaka.
Pakistani leadership was also under the wrong impression that they will stop the
Independence of Bangladesh through International powers however they weren’t
aware that they morally lost Bangladesh many months before decisive battle in
December 1971. Meanwhile India was being flooded with refugees crossing the
porous border in order to avoid the atrocities of the Army. In the subsequent
months approximately 9.7 million people left their homes, jobs and livelihood in
East Pakistan and became refugees in India.
The atrocities committed on the people of East
Pakistan was horrifying and beyond what the world saw in Second World War but
the west would not report it as they were supporting the wrong side. The Nixon administration
was unconcerned about the mounting atrocities because it was commencing an
unprecedented diplomatic overture to China, and it chose Genl. Yahya Khan to be its
mediator. The American President, who had a personal, visceral, and deeply
misogynistic hatred for India’s Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi refused to see
the barbarism committed by the Pakistanis and even threatened India with active
military intervention with their Seventh Fleet in case of a war. He even
beseeched China to feign intervention in the hopes of deterring Indian
involvement in the war.
The war
As if the
proxy war of 9.7 million refugees was not enough on December 3, 1971 Pakistan’s
Air Force conducted preemptive strikes on forward Indian airbases and radar
installations. This declaration of war too was a formality given the growing intensity of the
proxy war before the official onset of the bilateral confrontation. The Indian
Army had been training the Mukti Bahini and assisting them with arms and
intelligence. The timing suited India as the monsoon was over in Bengal and the
Himalayan passes were all blocked with snow to prevent any Chinese military
movement southwards. Mrs. Indira Gandhi meanwhile convinced the world that the
ongoing genocide was inhuman, far worse than the Second World War, and they cannot
look the other way. She had a trusted friend in U.S.S.R standing steadfastly
behind her and there were Soviet war ships all around the Indian peninsula.
Though smaller Maoist style paramilitary bands started
emerging from all parts of East Pakistan, the Mukti Bahini (freedom fighters)
became increasingly visible. Headed by Colonel Muhammad Ataul Gani Osmani, a
retired Pakistan Army officer, this band was raised as Mujib's action arm and
security force before assuming the character of a conventional guerrilla
force.
The Indian
Army, far superior in numbers and equipment to that of Pakistan, executed a
three-pronged pincer movement on Dhaka launched from West Bengal, Assam, and
Tripura. In all these places the Mukti Bahini and the local Bengalis played a
vital role in aiding the Indian Army. Many soldiers were ferried in the night
by the locals across rivers and valuable information on the location and
whereabouts of different military strongholds were gleaned. It was backed up by
the Indian Air Force which achieved near air supremacy towards the end of the
war as the entire East Pakistan airbase with all the flights was destroyed. The
Indian Navy also annihilated the eastern wing of the Pakistan Navy and
blockaded the East Pakistan ports, thereby cutting off any escape routes for
the stranded Pakistani warriors. The fledgling Bangladesh Navy (comprising
officers and sailors who defected from Pakistan Navy) aided the Indians in the
marine warfare, carrying out attacks, most notably Operation Jackpot.
As expected
the Pakistanis activated the Western front too but met with stiff resistance.
On December 16, within just 12 days, the capital Dhaka fell to the Mitro Bahini—the
allied forces. Lt. Gen. Niazi surrendered to the combined forces headed by its
commander Lt. Gen. Jagjit Singh Aurora by signing the Instrument of
Surrender at Ramna Racecourse, and at 16:31 Indian
Standard Time. Bangladesh became liberated.
Reaction in Pakistan
Reaction to
the defeat and dismemberment of half the nation was a shocking loss to top
military and layman alike. No one had expected that they would lose the formal
war in under a fortnight and were also very angry at the meek surrender of the
army in East Pakistan. The myth of the Pakistan Army's might was shattered and
the leadership stood exposed. General A. A. K. Niazi, who surrendered along with 93,000 troops, was
viewed with suspicion and hatred upon his return to Pakistan. He was shunned and branded a traitor. Genl. Yahya Khan's dictatorship collapsed and
gave way to the wily Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who took the opportunity to rise to power.
Why is
the ’71 War unique?
The 1971 war was unique for India because of
harmony that was seen between the political and the military establishment and because of the nobility of its cause.
Mrs. Gandhi prepared the grounds for a legitimate military intervention and
prepared the world opinion for the same. The Army under the legendary General S.H.F.J. Manekshaw got the timing right, the
execution perfect and despite being the victor didn’t overstay by a single day
or bring inconvenience to anybody. Not only this but on humanitarian scale too,
the vanquished Pakistanis should appreciate the Indian Army role for the
respectful treatment of their soldiers (POWs). Had they been left at the mercy
of the Mukti Bahini, beyond doubt yet another genocide would have ensued. Their
purpose was clear - to liberate the Bengalis from a barbaric rule, and once the mission
was accomplished they went back to their barracks. Can you say the same thing
about the U.S. military operations in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan?
